

U. S. NEWS COVERAGE OF THE MIDDLE EAST:
A SUMMARY OF SELECTED STUDIES WITH SUGGESTIONS
FOR ADDITIONAL ANALYSES

by

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INTRODUCTION

Assessing news distortion and bias in reporting, whether induced through ignorance or through deliberate policy, is an important problem in international mass communication research. News bias can create a distorted picture of reality and aid the development of an ethnocentric outlook. This, in turn, can hamper efforts in establishing understanding and international cooperation.

A classic example, involving the media, is the distortion caused in translating the oft-quoted Khrushchev remark, "We will bury you."

Klineberg notes "this has usually been interpreted in its active sense, that is, 'We will destroy you' or 'We will conquer you'." Variations include "We are going to bury you" and "We intend to bury you."

Klineberg points out that the translation "We will bury you" is literally correct but "in the sense that 'We will outlive you,' or 'We will still be alive when you are dead'." The phrase is meant to express the belief that "Communism will outlive Capitalism, not that the Communists will violently destroy the West."¹

Accurate newspaper accounts are necessary because they give meaning to what they portray and at the same time provide the concepts and imagery through which related events and phenomena may be understood. In international mass communication, the media's function might be seen as "interpreters of the world," enabling the reader to learn how to interpret and evaluate various aspects of the world.

Media-relayed knowledge is of primary importance in providing frames of reference or perspectives within which the reader is able to make sense of international events and his own experience.² Thus, the media might be seen as providing a "measure of reality by which to interpret the world's events."³ Bias and news distortion can provide a false view of what reality is, as manifested in the translation of Khrushchev's remark.

An erroneous view of reality can aid the development of an unrealistic picture of the world's events. And, as Allport has pointed out, ignorance is one of the most important barriers to international understanding.

How strong an impact the media have in this area is difficult to assess. But the meanings which events and situations are given are likely to be consistent with the cultural values with which the media are most closely identified. Thus, the media of a Western democracy could conceivably be inclined to give more favorable coverage to those countries which are perceived as being similar.

It is with the intent of maximizing international understanding and minimizing ethnocentrism that the necessity of balanced, objective news coverage (as free from cultural bias as possible) is required.

A recent British book, Publish it Not: The Middle East Cover-Up, by Michael Adams and Christopher Mayhew, asserts there has been misinformation in the British press concerning events in the Middle East which has not been accidental, but rather "crucial facts were deliberately disguised or suppressed in Western countries by pro-Israel pressures and propaganda."⁴ Its authors further claim "the purpose was to perpetuate the imbalance of power in the Middle East in the interest, not of peace or international harmony and certainly not of justice, but of the one country that stood to gain from the status quo: Israel."⁵

These are serious charges which have not been leveled solely at the British press. Arab participants in a recent editorial conference sponsored by the U.S. Overseas Press Club "scorned what they called the 'Zionist-controlled media' and accused them of obscuring loss of property by Palestinians and economic and physical hardships suffered by Arabs because of U.S. aid to Israel since 1948."⁶ Journalist and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) member Shafik al-Hout noted: "The chief problem facing the Palestinians is to convince the news media that they (the Palestinians) have been the principal victims of the Israeli-Arab dispute since 1948."⁷

In the 1954 International Press Institute (IPI) Survey, "The News from the Middle East," an American correspondent in the Middle East said: "The main 'restrictive practice' does not exist in the Middle East at all, but in the United States itself. American editors are nearly all afraid to tell the truth about the Israeli-Arab controversy because of the Zionist lobby."⁸

Another Middle East specialist noted: "Not many editors of American newspapers are really impartial in the treatment of news concerning the Middle East. If Arabs are involved in events contrary to Western policies or Western interests, such stories are generally amply covered and displayed prominently in the American press. But if events happen that are favorable or in line with policies of the Middle Eastern states, these are often ignored."⁹

How serious and relevant are these charges today? Arab unity and the formal use of oil as a political weapon (oil production cutbacks and embargo of exports to Western markets) mark a shift in power. While Washington has denounced the Arab tactics and coercion, the oil embargo has been a driving force in the U.S. peace-seeking efforts in the Middle East. "Petrodollars," the billions of dollars accumulated from oil sales, perpetuate the oil producers' political strength. And in response, the United States appears to be assuming a position which is more compatible "with the principle of what is right and just toward the Arab occupied territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people."¹⁰

Zionists, too, often claim news bias in favor of the Arab states and frequently equate it with anti-Semitism. The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) devotes considerable time to counteracting propaganda from the "petro-diplomatic complex," defined "as a coalition of oil lobbyists, diplomats and educators with cultural and theological interests in the Arab world."¹¹ Representatives of the 18 Arab states send a constant stream of propaganda to the U.S. Congress.

While there are indications of a movement toward presenting a more balanced picture of the Middle East--a strong need still exists to examine American newspaper content and coverage to determine the political objectivity of news stories in light of persistent criticisms.

This research paper will address itself to the problem of news flow from the Middle East, cultural difficulties in reporting the news, problems of pressure group influence on editorial policy and editorial bias.

Additionally, it is important to assess to what extent news distortion affects editors as well as readers. Here it is important to also keep in mind that newspapers are most often dependent on the international news agencies for news supplied from the Middle East.

A specific research proposal will be developed for the study of possible distortion and bias concerning news of the Middle East in U.S. daily newspaper²

The Problem of News Coverage from the Middle East

Reporting the news from the Middle East is a complex and difficult assignment. The absence of "common denominators" between East and West, the difference in languages and problems of working in a culture with "few points of contact with that of their own"¹² makes the Middle East story hard for a western correspondent to understand and more difficult to communicate to the public at home. Few western correspondents have managed to learn the Arabic language well enough to keep informed of developments by the local press or the cultural subtleties to "read between the lines" to understand fully what is happening in these countries.

In developing an understanding of some of the basic problems of news from the Middle East, a study of particular importance for background perspective is the 1954 IPI Survey, "The News from the Middle East." For data, the IPI relied primarily on critical judgments of the press itself. Questions on the nature and problems of news coverage were addressed to newspaper editors, foreign editors, foreign correspondents and specialists in the area. The study focused on the eight states of the Arab League--Egypt, Iraq, Libya, Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia ^{and} ~~and~~ Yemen--the Sudan, Arabia as a whole, Iran and Israel. Its purpose was to test the adequacy of existing news coverage in light of "censorship, costs and communication."¹³

Censorship emerged as a particular handicap in reporting news from the area. The threat of expulsion is an ever-present one for foreign correspondents, and government pressure on nationals (used by many news agencies to report news from the area) may be so overwhelmingly heavy as to seriously affect the tone and content of stories.

Government intimidation was noted for all Middle East countries. This was true not only of Arab countries and Iran, where restrictions are onerous, but also to some extent, Israel.

"Local men are inclined to close their eyes to things displeasing to their country. I do not mean to suggest that there is a regime of fear, but I know of cases in which excessively objective Israelis have been made to feel the displeasure of the Public Information Office of the Foreign Ministry," reported an American correspondent.¹⁴

Reporters also encountered suspicion and opposition in searching for news. Reasons cited included: 1. The low esteem in which journalism, as a profession, is held in parts of the Arab world. 2. The handicap of belonging to a foreign nation when failure of that nation to support a Middle Eastern country often reacts on the individual correspondent. 3. Constant confrontation with suspicious Arabs, who, well aware of the bad press they have in America, are reluctant to give out information for fear it might be used against them. 4. Attempts by Arab authorities, who regard reporting of their areas as unfair, to limit the view of the foreign correspondent to as narrow a field as possible.¹⁵

"Israeli propagandists succeeded in putting over such an unjust picture, for example of Iraq, in the foreign press while journalists working there were unable to get space to tell the unsensational truth--that the authorities found it hard to believe that anyone ever tried to tell the truth,"¹⁶ noted a British journalist.

Arab-Israeli Travel Embargo

Arab-Israeli conflict has only intensified problems of reporting the area. Free movement between Israel and the rest of the Middle East hampers the correspondent from obtaining an overall picture of the area. The tendency of the world press has been to leave Israel to be covered by the Israelis and to send the foreign reporter into the Arab world. The contrast in tone of the reports from the two areas has embittered Arab leaders and peoples. Most correspondents agreed that spending time on one side or other of the Arab-Israeli fence made it practically impossible to obtain a balanced picture of the whole area.¹⁷

A British foreign editor, experienced as a correspondent in the area, observed: "There is a serious lack of confidence between the Middle East governments and the press of the world for which the governments are not wholly responsible. Western editors and agencies have their share of responsibility. The Middle East as a whole is ignored except when things go wrong and then is very often misreported. Reports are slanted according to the prejudice and national interests of the countries involved."¹⁸

Cost was another factor cited by the survey in providing adequate news coverage in the Middle East. The area itself is vast, spanning 2,000 ^{square} miles and twelve countries. The size and number of countries involved dictates that costs would be prohibitive for many agencies if a correspondent for the capital of each country were assigned. News agencies try to solve this problem by basing correspondents in two or three capitals (Cairo, Beirut, Teheran, Tel Aviv) and employing, wherever possible, nationals of the country being reported.

Communications also present significant problems. In most capitals, communication channels were inadequate to handle the volume of traffic. Correspondents competed for wire "priority" at costly "urgent rates" which limited news stories to the "barest essentials."¹⁹

Survey Conclusions

The IPI survey found that with combined handicaps of censorship, costs and communications in reporting Middle East news, the world press was largely forced to rely on the large news agencies for coverage. Quality of Middle East coverage was ranked by contributors to the survey as "generally poor" with "good" reporting by a small percentage of newspapers who made serious efforts to cover the region.

Those newspapers providing "good coverage" combined the elements of continuous reporting, adequate background information and informed editorial comment. Despite this, they drew criticism for being too narrowly political with coverage confined to one or two countries.²⁰

General coverage by the world press was criticized as being superficial, incomplete and sensational. Main criticisms were:

1. Lack of material explaining the background of events reported.
2. Geographical unevenness of coverage: comparatively too much attention to Egypt, Iran and Israel, too little to the other countries in the area.
3. Too great a concentration on political news, too little on economic and social news which often shapes and portends political developments.
4. Distortion and bias in reporting and comment, partly through ignorance, partly through deliberate policy.
5. Too thin coverage by experienced senior foreign correspondents: too much of the news gathering left to less well qualified local correspondents, who have the additional disadvantage of being nationals of the extremely sensitive countries they are reporting.
6. Poor handling of the news received on the desk and consequent lack of stimulus to the reporter in the field. (21)

One salient observation of respondents was that "considerable better use could be made of available material if those in the home office of the newspaper knew more about the subject."²² News agencies complained that often a well-backgrounded story was cut to an extent which made it barely intelligible.

News Bias and Distortion

One of several criticisms about news coverage in the Middle East was that reporting often suffers from bias, either through the reporter's own predilections or through his newspaper's policy. Bias may be political, or more broadly, racial.²³

In general, contributors thought the distortion of Middle East news by deliberate use of false information was rare, but that distortion occurred for two reasons:

First, distortion sometimes sprung from ignorance on the part of the reporter; because of his inability to get all the facts and because of restrictions imposed on his reporting the facts. An example cited was the over-simplified reporting of French newspaperstaking "the easy line of attributing all developments in Iran to Communist propaganda, usually without seeking to distinguish between the effects of Communist scheming and genuine national aspirations."²⁴

The second, more serious cause, was the deliberate slanting of news to produce a certain effect in the reader's mind. This was attributed to a prejudice on the part of the reporter or the policy of his editor.²⁵ An example given by a British specialist was news coverage about the behavior of an Egyptian major in the Sudan. Major Saleh Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, visited the Sudan in the summer of 1953 to promote Egypt's case in the coming elections. During his tour he took part in a "fantasia" (celebration) and was photographed during the ceremonies dancing "deshabille" (without clothes). Whereupon, the British press nicknamed him the "Dancing Major" (one newspaper referring to him as "Underpants Salem").²⁶

These papers neglected to point out that British officials in the Sudan had often taken part in these dances with the Sudanese tribes as a complimentary gesture. And, that "in Western eyes the exhibition was neither dignified nor decent, but in the eyes of the Sudanese and of the Arabs generally, it was little more remarkable than the "exhibition" of the squire or parson taking part in a game of darts at the village local."²⁷

The type of coverage this story received in British papers was attributed by the specialist as being due either to the desire of the reporter to make a graphic headline or the political impulse to represent Egyptian behavior in the Sudan in an unfavorable light.²⁸

Whatever the cause, the Arab reaction to the British news coverage of the story was intense. "Reports and comments came back to the Sudan at once and were published and broadcast all over the Arab world. In many quarters they were represented as a subversive attempt by the British to discredit their opponents on lines that were neither justified by the past nor pertinent under any condition."²⁹

Bias may also spring from the correspondent's own particular beliefs. Many foreign correspondents admitted the atmosphere in which they worked in the Middle East was so heavily charged with emotionalism about rights and wrongs--of the semi-colonial Arab country asserting itself against its former "protector" and of the Arab versus the Jew--that they found it difficult to remain objective.³⁰

"The Americans appear to be sending a well-rounded picture from most parts of the Middle East except Israel. Here most correspondents are won over by the Israelis because of the little state's valiant struggle for existence. They give little emphasis to the bleaker side of life there. One seldom reads about sub-standard living conditions, exorbitant prices, black markets and discrimination against Israeli Arabs. Instead we get a picture that is all milk and honey," observed an American correspondent.³¹

A British specialist on the Middle East noted that English newspapers "give a reasonably accurate picture of Egypt and Israel when there are not direct British interests at stake. But, as soon as these come on the scene, reporting is more in the nature of political warfare than objective coverage."³²

American Institute for Political Communication Report

A more recent study was completed in the aftermath of the Middle East Six Day War (1967) precipitated by Nasser's blockade of the Gulf Aqaba and the resultant "pre-emptive" Israeli air attack. The American Institute for Political Communication issued a special report entitled "Domestic Communication Aspects of the Middle East Crisis." The report's purpose was to provide an "overall view of the manner in which the U.S. government, daily newspapers and key interest groups sought to communicate with the American public at the height of this Middle East crisis."³³

The Institute is a "non-partisan, non-profit organization dedicated to improving the flow of government and political affairs information....through independent study, analysis and reporting of the dissemination process."³⁴ While this was a broad study of communication during the period between May 23 and May 29, 1967, part of it focused on analysis of news stories, editorials and columnists in ten major U.S. dailies, media access of special interest groups and content of congressional speeches.

News Stories

A comprehensive analysis of how ten of the nation's major newspapers handled news during this period was conducted. Papers surveyed were nearly all "elite, quality" morning publications, representing major geographical divisions in the United States. These papers had 8 per cent of the nation's daily circulation and 20 per cent of its morning circulation. Newspaper circulations ranged from about 200,000 to more than 750,000. Analysis revealed the following:

1. General in-depth coverage by all papers with variations in the scope of such coverage, and considerable dependence on "authoritative, officials and related sources" not specifically identified.
2. East and West coast news coverage was more extensive than South, Southwest and Northwest--while Midwest papers showed great variation.
3. The single most often quoted source for the "lead or top story was President Nasser of Egypt. In more than 50 per cent where Nasser was a primary source, the headline and/or lead paragraphs focused on those aspects of his statement which portrayed him as belligerent, threatening or uncooperative in furthering peace efforts."

4. Most top level stories attributed to Israeli government sources opened in a way which tended to place the Israelis in a cooperative or defensive light.
5. Most statements attributed to Nasser were based either on Cairo Radio broadcasts or on articles appearing in the Egyptian newspaper, Al Ahram.
6. Most statements attributed to the Israeli government and coming out of Israel were based on discussions with Israeli officials who often were not specifically identified. (35)

There was not enough data available to merit conclusions about news story placement and headline.

But this study does indicate the need for further research and concern about Middle East news story sources and thematic qualities assigned to those sources. It is interesting to note that while Nasser appeared as the primary source in over 50 per cent of the news stories--statements attributed to him were actually derived from "secondary sources" such as Cairo Radio broadcasts and Al Ahram. Here again, literal translation may pose additional problems.

Those statements attributed to the Israeli government were actually based on "primary sources," that is actual discussions with Israeli government officials. Finally, the question should be asked about what the relationship is between primary and secondary sources and thematic qualities attributed to each side. Further research is indicated in the need to determine how and why the presentation was made of Nasser as "belligerent, threatening and un-cooperative" while Israelis were presented as "cooperative and defensive."

Editorial Opinions

An analysis of editorial opinions expressed in these same ten papers, revealed:

1. General editorial condemnation of Egypt's blockade of Aqaba.
2. General support of the Israelis.
3. Emphasis on employing the United Nations to resolve the crisis, and general reluctance to commit U.S. troops unilaterally. (36)

Newspapers on the East Coast were ranked as "more aggressive" in their support of the Israeli position than those elsewhere in the country.

Columnists

Syndicated columnists based in New York and Washington produced a flood of columns, during this time period, which dealt with the situation in the Middle East. There were 18 columnists surveyed with a circulation ranging from 50 to 60 papers to Drew Pearson, whose syndicate claims a circulation in excess of 600 papers. Most columnists had a circulation of about 100 different papers. Results were:

1. A substantial number took a position favorable to Israel which went beyond the announced policy of the United States government.
2. Columns sympathetic to the Arab countries were "virtually non-existent."
3. Of 18 columnists publishing 58 columns, only one wrote a column which set out the difficulties, problems and needs of the Arabs, and pointed up the situation of the Arab refugees. Combined with another columnist who viewed the situation in "long-range" terms--this amounted to two neutral columns--the rest were ranked either pro-Israel or pro-U.S. policy.

4. A small majority of the columnists viewed the crisis chiefly or exclusively from the perspective of U.S. foreign policy. (37)

Acknowledging the general pro-Israel stance taken by columnists and reflected in editorial opinions combined with preliminary indications of source differences and qualities attributed to these sources in news stories; indicates a need for further research to determine how editorial opinion might be reflected in news stories and editorial judgements about news stories. Factors to be considered in this regard would include strength and extent of editorial opinion, as well as news story tone, length, placement and headline.

Media Access, Lobbyists and Public Opinion

Three additional factors related to news bias and distortion, those of media access, lobby groups and direction of public opinion, should be briefly reviewed in understanding the news about the Middle East.

The American Institute for Political Communication Survey noted that many organizations issued position statements on the Middle East crisis in the crucial two-week period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities on June 5. It was observed that "the media gave some of these statements massive 'play,' buried others so that they could not be easily perceived, and mentioned some not at all."³⁸

Serious questions about fair and balanced coverage can be raised concerning media access or lack of access by established interest groups during this period. Organizations taking anti-Zionist or pro-Arab (these are not synonymous) positions in connection with the Middle East crisis reported they experienced great difficulty in getting their views published by the daily press in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of hostilities. The report made no mention of pro-Israel or anti-Arab organizations experiencing difficulty in getting their views published.

The American Council for Judaism (a Jewish, anti-Zionist organization) said a press release issued on May 29 to wire services, some 200 major dailies and 75 Washington correspondents and others, was virtually suppressed by the daily press. The Chicago Tribune and the New York Times made "very brief" reference to the statement, which called for: "A recognition of the deep problems developed over the fifty-year history of the conflict, urged all Great Powers to bring both sides to the conference table" and "urged American Zionists, most of whom are fellow Jews, to cease and desist from perhaps well-meaning but ill-advised efforts to pressure the U.S. government into always taking absolute and militant pro-Israel positions."³

The American Friends of the Middle East reported that a letter sent on May 31 to the editors of the Washington Post, Washington Star and New York Times was published in the Post on June 8 "after several phone calls," was not published by the Star and was rejected by the Times.

Their letter urged viewing the Aqaba blockage within a historical context and stated: "An Israel abiding by UN resolutions and at peace with its Arab neighbors can be the only goal consistent with American national interests--and, in truth, Israel's real interest."⁴⁰

The Arab Information Center's press statement of May 31, was issued to the press associations, a number of newspapers and all Members of Congress. A spokesman said "no daily published the statement or any part of it."⁴¹

This statement cited a distortion on the part of various news media in the presentation of the factors and facts leading to the crisis, and said: "As a result of this gross distortion, the average American could hardly be expected to form a true and impartial opinion of the Israeli-Arab dispute."⁴² The statement then sought to put the immediate crisis into context by citing precedents in international law, incidents of Israeli aggression and threats against Syria, and raised a question about the status of Arab refugees.

Congressional speeches at this time also reflect strong pro-Israel sentiment. During the period between May 23 and June 8, 1967; 146 Senators and Congressmen representing 35 states placed 226 statements in "The Congressional Record" relating in one way or another to the Middle East crisis. About 98 per cent of the statements or speeches took a position favorable or very favorable to Israel.⁴³

This pro-Israel political response might call to mind President Truman's philosophy in regard to Israel, which has been intimately involved in American domestic politics ever since Truman decided to work for its creation after World War II.

Truman's decision to do so ran counter to the advice of U.S. diplomats who served in the Middle East. When they warned that support for Israel would jeopardize American relations with the Arabs and damage wider American interests in the Middle East, Truman reportedly replied: "I'm sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands who are anxious for the success of Zionism; I do not have hundreds of thousands of Arabs among my constituents."⁴⁴

In looking at special interest groups and lobbyists, it is readily apparent that Arab-Americans are heavily outweighed by American Jews in both numbers and financial resources. The Jewish Statistical Bureau estimates that 5.9 million Americans are Jewish, while the Arab Information Center estimates there are between 1 and 1.5 million persons of Arab ancestry living in the United States.⁴⁵

Lobby groups operate in the United States on the behalf of Israeli interests and Arab interests. Zionism, as a political philosophy, has been established here since the 1890's, and was as instrumental force in the campaign for the partition of Palestine.

The American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is the Jewish umbrella organization which keeps watch in Congress over the Israel and United States ties. Supported by non-deductible contributions, the AIPAC operates on a budget of \$200,000 a year and represents major Jewish organizations on Capitol Hill. Jewish fundraising organizations are not part of the AIPAC umbrella, a measure taken to protect their tax deductible status. AIPAC chairman, I. L. (Si) Kenen said in a 1974 interview, "I rarely go to the Hill, there is so much support for Israel that I don't have to go."⁴⁶

On the other hand, groups representing Arab interests are relatively young and still rather ineffective in changing congressional sentiment on Middle East policy. The National Association of Arab Americans (NAAA), while not officially registered as a lobby, is an active umbrella organization for other Arab interest groups. Established in 1972, the NAAA's activities are financed by membership dues and contributions. While declining to reveal donation totals, the NAAA counted 1,000 contributors (voting members) donating between \$25 and \$5,000 each in 1974. (The dues and contributions are not tax deductible).⁴⁷

Causes of the relative weakness in representation of Arab interests in the past, have been sought in explanations of disunity within the Arab-American community, lack of pro-Arab leadership on the national level and the tendency of middle-class and professional Arabs to assimilate into the American mainstream.⁴⁸

But sheer size and financial resources help account for the discrepancies between the two groups. From 1948 to 1968, the United Jewish Appeal provided over \$1 billion in aid to Israel.⁴⁹ During the October 1973 war, American pledges of cash gifts and purchases of Israeli bonds reportedly climbed to the \$300 million level. In comparison, during 1973, the United Holy Land Fund, an Arab-American organization, launched a fund with a modest goal of \$200,000 for war relief.

Religion, too, plays a part in generating strong sympathy for Israel. While 5.9 million Americans are of the Jewish faith, there are only about 235,000 Muslims. Though the nation's people have no strong identification with the Muslim religion, Christian churches have supported Judaism and have condemned anti-Semitism. Public outrage at Nazi Germany's atrocities committed against Jews further swings public opinion in favor of the Zionist cause.

Public opinion in the United States reflects an overwhelming support of Israel. Gallup surveys show the same basic pattern of support for Israel has existed in 1967, 1969, 1970 and 1973: about 50 per cent sympathetic to Israel, less than 10 per cent sympathetic to the Arabs and the rest uncommitted or opinionless.⁵⁰

In evaluating the Gallup survey, problems of validity and accuracy in polling, particularly in regard to the "don't know" or "undecided" categories, should be kept in mind. Hennessy points out that these categories are often inadequately interpreted and generally underestimated. People are reluctant to admit lack of knowledge of a situation, and question structure and interview situations can combine to make it easy for respondents to give definite answers even though they may have no knowledge of the situation. This may lead to serious error in measuring real opinion.

It is also important to keep in mind that the Gallup surveys reflect the effects of a large Jewish population and small Arab population in the United States.

With this background information--indications of news bias and distortion, sources and overall story tone, media access or lack of access, pressure groups, political, public and editorial opinions--a strong case emerges for an investigation of the nature and relationship between U.S. newspaper editorial sentiment and news coverage of the Middle East.

Most newspapers seek to maintain an independent presentation of editorial opinions and news. The standard of balanced, objective reporting of inherently political news issues is an accepted ethical obligation of the American press.

With regard to the U.S. government's historical identification with and openly expressed support of the state of Israel, it would be useful to have objective techniques to determine how much editorial support daily newspapers give to Israel. If editorial opinion is found to be either predominantly "pro-Israel" or "pro-Arab," it would be equally interesting to observe whether these sentiments are reflected in or affect the placement, emphasis and tone of news stories concerning the Middle East.

HYPOTHESIS

The hypothesis for this proposed study is that U.S. daily newspapers will reflect a consistent "pro-Israel" sentiment in editorial opinions. It is hypothesized that "pro-Arab" sentiment will be minimized. It is further hypothesized that editorial bias on the part of a newspaper could lead to news distortion in tone, placement, length and headlines assigned to news stories concerning Israelis and Palestinians.

RESEARCH DESIGN

All editorials and front pages, on specific dates, will be examined in five U.S. daily newspapers to determine what relationship or similarity might be expressed between editorial statements and news story tone and placement. Conversely, the question of what influence front pages might have on editorial views will also be considered.

Measures would include: reader attention score, thematic content analysis and overall column inches including jumps (stories continued inside the paper) within each category.

As Budd has noted, "content analysis is a systematic technique for classifying message content and message handling -- it is a tool for observing and analyzing the overt communication behavior of selected communicators."⁵¹ In this study, content analysis will be employed as a means of classifying content in terms of direction using the following thematic categories: pro-Israel; anti-Arab; pro-Arab; anti-Israel; and Neutral or Balanced.

Classifying both editorials and front page news stories in the presence or absence of these categories should make clear the relationship between front page news stories concerning the Middle East and editorial views expressed on the editorial pages.

Additionally, editorials and news stories within each thematic category will be counted and measured in terms of overall column inches in order to determine how much space articles falling within each category are given by the newspapers.

Reader attention scores will also be calculated for news stories appearing on the front page. While this is a somewhat subjective method of evaluation and not perhaps an accurate index of the readers' attention--it should shed light on the subjective evaluations editors make and the importance they assign to various news stories about the Middle East.

Budd's method of measuring the attention score of news stories based on a five-point scale will be used. This score is based on the length of the story, its page position and heading width; and the method is readily adaptable to measurement of political orientation in news stories. The attention score is ranked on a scale of 0 to 5, based on the following measures:

1. News story headlines: zero for one-column heads; one point for two columns or more, two points for any number of columns greater than half the page width.
2. Page position: one point for news story in the top half, zero for a story in the bottom half of the page.
3. Length of story: one point for a story $\frac{3}{4}$ column long or more, including pictures if any.
(52)

Comparison and analysis of the the results will be utilized to determine the validity of the hypothesis and to establish what, if any, influence editorial attitude has on news direction as well as how front page news stories might effect editorial opinion.

Categories

As in all content analysis studies, the categories will have to be redefined and elaborated in more detail after the study data is compiled.

Concepts Defined: (1) pro-Israel; (2) anti-Arab; (3) pro-Arab; (4) anti-Israel; and (5) Neutral or Balanced

pro-Israel

Conceptual - Israel is a pro-Western democracy, which has a unique right to exist. The U.S. should support Israel with financial, political and military backing. Palestine is viewed as the ancient cradle of the Jewish civilization, and rightfully belongs to the Jewish people, particularly in repatriation for injustices suffered in Nazi Germany.

Operational - Editorial opinion favorable to Israel. Israelis portrayed as cooperative and defensive. News stories reflect favorable, positive coverage of Israel. News placement and headlines favorable to the Israeli cause. Israeli guerrilla activities minimized.

anti-Arab

Conceptual - Arab hostility threatens the very existence of the state of Israel. Arab nations are portrayed as having united in the common cause of "destroying the tiny democracy of Israel," and are using oil as a weapon of blackmail. Arab nations are portrayed as wanting to "push Israel into the sea" and as anti-Jewish or anti-Semitic.

Operational - Editorial opinion condemning Arab tactics. Palestinians and Arabs portrayed as belligerent and threatening. News stories reflect unfavorable, negative coverage of Arab nations. News placement and headlines unfavorable to Arabs. Palestinian guerrilla activities given maximum publicity and condemned.

pro-Arab

Conceptual - Arab nations seen as having the right to unify politically and economically as other alliances such as the European Economic Community have. Oil embargo viewed as a "peaceful solution" to the problem of Western arm shipments to Israel. Palestinians viewed as being unfairly dispossessed of their homes and property.

Operational - Editorial opinion acknowledging Palestinian rights and claims and urging Israel to take a more active role in solving problems in the Middle East. News stories reflect favorable, positive coverage of Arabs. News placement and headlines favorable to Arabs and the Palestinian cause. Palestinian guerilla activities minimized. News stories concerning life in Palestinian refugee camps.

anti-Israel

Conceptual - Israel has seized lands unfairly during the 1967 war and has refused to obey U.N. resolutions. Israel should recognize legitimacy of Palestinian claims and its own social and financial responsibilities in the situation. Israel should return lands seized during the war.

Operational - Editorial opinion condemning Israeli tactics. Israelis portrayed as aggressors and raids on Palestinian camps given maximum publicity and condemned. Follow-up news telling effects of Israeli bombing of camps. News stories reflect unfavorable, negative coverage of Israel. News placement and headlines unfavorable to Israel.

Neutral or Balanced

Conceptual - Recognition of the Middle East problems within the historical context of their development. Conflict in claims acknowledged: Jewish homeland may be the "cradle of civilization" yet Arabs have made their home in Palestine for the past 1,000 years. Recognition of the roles of the British, French and U.S. in influencing the development of Israel. Roles of the U.S. and USSR acknowledged in respect to financial and military backing of Middle Eastern countries.

Operational - Editorial opinion presenting a balanced view and historical perspective on the situation. And, acknowledging the necessity of including the Palestinians at the conference table. Balanced coverage, news story placement and headlines given to news stories and guerrilla activities on both sides. Negative and positive aspects of Israeli and Arab societies evenly presented.

All editorials pertaining to the Middle East (Israel, Palestinians and Arabs) and appearing in these papers on specific dates will be analysed in terms of editorial direction: pro-Israel; anti-Arab; pro-Arab; anti-Israel, and Neutral or Balanced. Editorials in each category will be counted and measured in column inches to obtain an over-all measure for frequency and amount of space given editorials in each category.

In addition, news stories appearing on all front pages of these issues will be ranked in terms of editorial direction: pro-Israel; anti-Arab; pro-Arab; anti-Israel, and Neutral or Balanced. News stories in each category will be counted and measured in column inches to obtain an over-all measure for frequency and amount of space given stories in each category.

Since only front pages are included in news story samples, it will be relatively easy to determine how much front page space each newspaper assigns to news of the Middle East, as well as what percentage of this space falls into the above categories.

Sample

Morning dailies representing four major geographical regions of the U.S. were chosen for the study: The New York Times (East); St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Milwaukee Journal (Midwest); Houston Post (South, Southwest) and the Los Angeles Times (West). Morning papers were chosen because of their tendency to emphasize foreign news over evening papers. The sample will consist of the latest morning editions of these papers.

Quality "elite" newspapers were selected because of their key influence in their respective states and cities, their impact with intellectuals and opinion leaders, general level of acceptance, and reputation for setting standards for smaller papers in their regions.

In choosing "elite" papers, Merrill's marks of the elite press were utilized: (1) Independence; financial stability; integrity; social concern; good writing and editing. (2) Strong opinion and interpretive emphasis; world consciousness; non-sensationalism. (3) Emphasis on politics, international relations, economics, social welfare, cultural endeavors, education and science. (4) Concern with getting, developing and keeping a large, intelligent, well-educated staff and (5) Determination to serve and help expand a well-educated, intelligent readership; desire to appeal to and influence opinion leaders everywhere.⁵³

Population

The sampling population would consist of newspaper issues on specific dates, during three separate years, tentatively, 1967, 1973 and 1975. Twenty issues of each newspaper would be randomly selected to represent a specific three-month period during each of these years. Some method of objective selection of each three-month period would need to be devised to eliminate selector's bias. The Facts on File index or a similar one could be utilized in some manner as the basis for objective, random sampling of time periods.

The proposed sampling unit would be the calendar date. One approach to sampling dates, which has been tested for validity, is the constructed time period, devised by Carter and Jones.⁵⁴

A "constructed month" arbitrarily set at 20 days, would be devised for each three-month period. This would be done by creating an artificial month consisting of 20 days and by drawing calendar dates randomly from the three-month period (the defined universe). Selections of odd and even dates would be made randomly and a table of random numbers devised to make selections.

A method would need to be developed to insure an equal distribution of the days of the week since news volume varies from day to day. Also, the weeks of the entire time period would need to be stratified through a system which would insure an equal distribution representative of the time period.

Thus, 100 issues of the five newspapers would be examined for each year. The total sample universe would equal 300 newspapers. More specifically, the universe would consist of all editorials (for editorial opinions) and all front pages (for news stories) in these newspapers.

Results

The results of this study should prove or disprove the hypothesis that U.S. daily newspapers will reflect a consistent "pro-Israel" sentiment in editorial opinions and that "pro-Arab" sentiment will be minimized.

It should be kept in mind though, that newspapers are most often dependent on the international news agencies for news about the Middle East. And, as noted in previous studies, cited some degree of distortion and bias may originate with the correspondent's story.

It is also difficult to measure what impact efforts of Arab and Israeli lobbyists have on public opinion and newspaper editors. Certainly the existence of a large Jewish population in the U.S. helps promote cultural identity with Israel and the Zionist cause. The little exposure the nation's people have had in regard to Arabs and the Muslim religion may make understanding and identification with the Palestinian cause more difficult.

The results of this study should make clear the relationship between editorial bias and tone, placement, headlines and length of front page stories concerning the Middle East. Further indications would include what influence, if any, editorial attitude may have upon news story direction; and also to what extent news stories about the Middle East might affect editorial opinions.

Such analysis is useful in assessing the political objectivity of the press in general, and gives us a picture of whether news distortion or bias is present. This could be seen if one group is given obvious favorable coverage in terms of headline tone, story tone, length and placement over another group. Regional differences in U.S. newspapers' coverage of the Middle East may also be indicated.

Analysis should tell us what subjective evaluations editors may apply to front page stories containing news from the area.

Results of this type of study might also aid the reader in gauging the trustworthiness of Middle East news coverage in his newspapers--as well as providing an outside measure of balance and objectivity on the part of editors and reporters.

FOOTNOTES

¹Otto Klineberg. The Human Dimension in International Relations (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1966), p. 153.

²Paul Hartman and Charles Hubbard. Racism and the Mass Media (Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield, 1974), p. 61.

³Ibid., p. 62.

⁴Palestine Digest, September 1975, Vol. 5, p. 10.

⁵Ibid., p. 11.

⁶Charles Eischen, "Arabs Plea to the American Press: We Are Not Terrorists!" Quill, October 1974, p. 10.

⁷Ibid., p. 10.

⁸The News From the Middle East, International Press Institute Survey No. III (Zurich 1954), p. 74.

⁹Ibid., p. 74.

¹⁰U. S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs (Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc. 1974), p. 35.

¹¹Ibid., p. 54.

¹²The News From the Middle East, p. 9.

¹³Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁶Ibid., p. 37.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 43.

FOOTNOTES (Continued)

¹⁸Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 98.

²⁰Ibid., p. 99.

²¹Ibid., p. 99.

²²Ibid., p. 101.

²³Ibid., p. 62.

²⁴Ibid., p. 71.

²⁵Ibid., p. 72.

²⁶Ibid., p. 72.

²⁷Ibid., p. 73.

²⁸Ibid., p. 72.

²⁹Ibid., p. 73.

³⁰Ibid., p. 73.

³¹Ibid., p. 73.

³²Ibid., p. 74.

³³Domestic Communication Aspects of the Middle East Crisis (Washington: American Institute for Political Communication, July 1967), p. 1.

³⁴Ibid., p. 2.

³⁵Ibid., pp. 1, 6, 8.

³⁶Ibid., pp. 2, 7.

FOOTNOTES (Continued)

- ³⁷Ibid., p. 2.
- ³⁸Ibid., p. 3.
- ³⁹Ibid., p. 4.
- ⁴⁰Ibid., p. 5.
- ⁴¹Ibid., p. 6.
- ⁴²Ibid., p. 6.
- ⁴³Ibid., p. 8.
- ⁴⁴U. S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, p. 9.
- ⁴⁵Ibid., p. 58.
- ⁴⁶Ibid., p. 54.
- ⁴⁷Ibid., p. 56.
- ⁴⁸Ibid., p. 53.
- ⁴⁹"Zionism in the United States," Encyclopedia Judaica, (New York: Macmillan Company 1971), Vol. 16, p. 1147.
- ⁵⁰U. S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs, p. 55.
- ⁵¹Richard W. Budd & Robert K. Thorp, An Introduction to Content Analysis (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), p. 2.
- ⁵²Philip J. Coffey, "A Quantitative Measure of Bias in Reporting Political News," Journalism Quarterly, Fall 1975, p. 551.
- ⁵³John C. Merrill, The Elite Press (New York: Pitman Publishing Corporation, 1968), pp. 30-31.
- ⁵⁴An Introduction to Content Analysis, p. 25.

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
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Partition of Palestine: U.S. Policy Developments

With the breakup of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Palestine's fate was left up to Great Britain, France and Russia. Britain had pledged to support the independence of the Arab areas, in correspondence during 1915 between Sir Henry McMahon, high commissioner of Egypt, and Hussain ibn Ali, sherif of Mecca.

But, according to a secret agreement reached in 1916 by the British, French and Russian governments (known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement), the Arab areas were to be divided into British and French spheres of influence and Palestine was to be internationalized. Arabs later cited this agreement in charging they had been deceived by European imperialists.

Balfour Declaration. On Nov. 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour pledged in a letter to Lord Rothschild, leader of the British Zionists, that Britain would support the establishment in Palestine of a "national home" for the Jewish people, on the clear understanding that "nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine...."

Reaction to the Balfour Declaration in the United States was positive. President Woodrow Wilson endorsed the statement before its publication and Congress adopted a resolution approving the declaration in September 1922.

U.S. Role. The United States never declared war on the Ottoman Empire, an ally of Germany in World War I, but President Wilson strongly influenced the final peace settlements which set forth the basic boundaries of the Middle East states. His major contribution was the concept of interim League of Nations mandates which would eventually lead to independent states.

The United States sent a commission (King-Crane Commission) to the former Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire to determine their views on postwar settlements. The commission's final report in 1919—never formally accepted by the Paris Peace Conference or the U.S. government—called for a serious modification of the "extreme Zionist program" and advised against the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Palestine Mandate. In July 1922 the League of Nations approved Britain's mandate to Palestine, which went into force Sept. 22, 1923. The mandate instrument included a preamble incorporating the Balfour Declaration and stressing the Jewish historical connection with Palestine. Britain was made responsible for placing the country under such "political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of a Jewish National Home...."

In the mid-1940s the push to lift restrictions—set forth in a 1939 British government White Paper—on Jewish immigration into Palestine gained support, especially in the United States. (*Jewish migration to Palestine*, p. 19-25)

In August 1945, President Harry S Truman called for the free settlement of Palestine by Jews to the point consistent with the maintenance of civil peace. Later

that month Truman suggested in a letter to British Prime Minister Clement R. Atlee that an additional 100,000 Jews be allowed to enter Palestine. In December, both houses of Congress adopted a resolution urging U.S. aid in opening Palestine to Jewish immigrants and in building a "democratic commonwealth."

Anglo-American Committee. In November 1945, Britain, anxious to have the United States share responsibility for its Palestine policy, joined with the United States in deciding to create a commission to examine the problem of European Jews and Palestine. In the meantime, Britain agreed to permit an additional 1,500 Jews to enter Palestine each month. A 75,000 limit had been set by the 1939 White Paper.

In April 1946 the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews into Palestine, and continuation of the British mandate until establishment of a United Nations trusteeship. Truman immediately endorsed the immigration proposal but Britain stipulated prior disbandment of underground Jewish forces in Palestine.

The President in October released a communication sent to the British government in which he appealed for "substantial immigration" into Palestine "at once" and expressed support for the Zionist plan for creation of a "viable Jewish state" in part of Palestine. A British government spokesman expressed regret that Truman's statement had been made public because it might jeopardize a settlement.

United Nations. Britain turned to the United Nations in early 1947, when a London conference of Arab and Zionist representatives failed to resolve the Palestinian question. The United Nations set up an inquiry committee which ultimately recommended that Palestine be divided into two separate Arab and Jewish states, with Jerusalem and vicinity to be an international zone under permanent U.N. trusteeship.

The United States and Soviet Union agreed on the partitioning of Palestine, and on Nov. 29, 1947, the U.N. General Assembly voted to divide Palestine. Britain—setting May 15, 1948, as the date its mandate would terminate—refused to share responsibility with the U.N. Palestine Commission during the transitional period because the U.N. solution was not acceptable to both sides.

Civil war broke out shortly after the U.N. decision was made. In March 1948 the United States voiced opposition to the forcible partitioning of Palestine and called for suspension of the plan. The United States urged a special session of the General Assembly.

In April the Security Council adopted a U.S. resolution calling for a truce and a special session of the General Assembly. But it was too late to stop the division of Palestine. On May 14, the British high commissioner left Palestine, the state of Israel was proclaimed and the General Assembly voted to send a mediator to the Holy Land to seek a truce.

The United States granted Israel de facto recognition immediately. The Soviet Union recognized the new state three days later.

United States Economic and Military . . .

(U.S. fiscal years—millions of dollars)*

	1946- 1952	1953- 1961	1962- 1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973 ¹	Total 1946- 1973
ISRAEL										
Economic ²	221.5	564.7	296.5	75.5	75.3	51.1	86.8	125.3	131.4	1,619.1
Loans	135.0	305.8	272.0	75.0	74.7	50.7	86.5	74.9	80.5	1,147.5
Grants	86.5	258.9	24.4	0.5	0.6	0.4	0.3	50.4	50.9	471.5
Military ³	—	0.9	136.4	25.0	85.0	30.0	545.0	300.0	307.5	1,429.8
Credit Sales	—	0.9	136.4	25.0	85.0	30.0	545.0	300.0	307.5	1,429.8
Grants	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
ALGERIA										
Economic ²	—	4.6	172.1	—	2.0	2.2	15.0	21.9	187.8	404.9
Loans	—	—	11.6	—	—	—	15.0	21.8	187.6	236.1
Grants	—	4.6	160.5	—	2.0	2.2	—	0.1	0.2	168.8
Military ³	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
EGYPT										
Economic ²	19.6	332.9	590.4	—	—	—	—	104.6	11.5	1,028.5
Loans	18.0	162.7	445.9	—	—	—	—	104.6	11.5	735.8
Grants	1.6	170.2	144.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	292.7
Military ³	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
IRAN										
Economic ²	42.3	618.2	307.6	42.0	7.9	46.1	84.8	44.5	83.2	1,259.4
Loans	25.8	267.0	214.6	39.7	6.5	44.7	83.6	42.1	81.9	799.3
Grants	16.5	351.2	93.1	2.3	1.4	1.4	1.2	2.4	1.3	460.2
Military ³	16.8	451.4	636.9	122.1	128.3	2.6	122.1 ⁴	113.6 ⁴	200.0 ⁴	1,794.0
Credit Sales	—	—	299.8	100.0	104.2	—	—	—	—	504.0
Grants	16.6	436.1	332.3	22.1	23.9	2.6	2.1	0.9	—	836.7
IRAQ										
Economic ²	1.4	21.6	34.1	5	0.3	0.2	2.5	0.3	0.3	57.3
Loans	0.9	—	25.1	5	—	—	—	0.1	0.2	26.3
Grants	0.5	21.6	9.0	5	0.3	0.2	2.5	0.2	0.1	31.0
Military ³	—	47.2	0.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	47.8
Credit Sales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	46.1	0.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	46.7
JORDAN										
Economic ²	5.2	275.4	287.3	19.0	11.8	12.2	16.8	59.4	77.2	753.1
Loans	—	4.7	18.3	1.8	1.5	8.3	1.2	1.7	22.5	56.2
Grants	5.2	270.7	269.0	17.2	10.3	3.9	15.6	57.7	54.7	696.9
Military ³	—	15.8	55.9	0.4	14.2	0.2	59.3	49.3	39.7	234.7
Credit Sales	—	—	15.0	—	14.0	—	30.0	10.0	—	69.0
Grants	—	15.5	37.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	28.9	38.0	32.8	152.8
KUWAIT										
Economic ²	—	—	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	50.0
Loans	—	—	50.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	50.0
Grants	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Military ³	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
LEBANON										
Economic ²	3.6	97.9	3.4	4.2	4.9	12.5	2.2	18.1	1.2	127.8
Loans	1.6	20.3	—	3.9	3.3	11.1	1.9	8.1	—	37.2
Grants	2.0	77.6	3.4	0.3	1.6	1.4	0.3	10.0	1.2	90.6
Military ³	—	8.2	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	5.1	10.2	10.2	34.6
Credit Sales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10.0	10.0	20.0
Grants	—	8.1	0.7	0.1	0.1	0.1	5.1	0.2	0.2	14.5
LIBYA										
Economic ²	1.8	173.1	41.4	1.7	2.2	0.4	—	5	—	212.5
Loans	—	8.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7.0
Grants	1.8	164.6	41.4	1.7	2.2	0.4	—	5	—	205.5
Military ³	—	2.7	11.8	1.1	0.4	0.1	—	—	—	16.1
Credit Sales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	2.6	11.4	1.0	0.4	0.1	—	—	—	15.4

* Figures may not add to totals due to rounding. Annual figures do not add up to cumulative totals because the fiscal year figures since FY 1955 represent new obligations entered into during those years on a gross basis; the cumulative figures for FY 1946-1972 are on a net basis, reflecting total denobligations where funds obligated were not actually spent. Congressional Quarterly added AID's net cumulative figures for FY 1946-1972 to AID's preliminary FY 1973 amounts to obtain figures in total column.

¹ Figures for fiscal 1973 preliminary.

² Economic aid totals included official development assistance, Food for Peace programs, Peace Corps, Export-Import Bank loans and miscellaneous development assistance and loan programs.

SOURCE: Agency for International Development

... Assistance to the Middle East, 1946-1973

(U.S. fiscal years—millions of dollars)*

	1946- 1952	1953- 1961	1962- 1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973 ¹	Total
MOROCCO										
Economic ²	0.3	290.4	286.4	73.5	44.6	36.4	77.5	57.6	33.1	890.3
Loans	—	192.9	151.2	49.4	19.6	16.4	53.1	47.1	21.5	548.3
Grants	0.3	97.5	135.3	24.1	25.0	20.0	24.4	10.5	11.6	342.0
Military ³	—	2.4	54.4	1.7	11.7	0.8	15.8	15.9	9.9	112.3
Credit Sales	—	—	20.2	—	9.5	—	15.0	15.0	9.8	69.4
Grants	—	2.4	30.4	1.7	2.0	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.1	38.9
SAUDI ARABIA										
Economic ²	19.5	27.9	—	12.0	—	—	—	13.4	⁵	72.0
Loans	19.1	—	—	12.0	—	—	—	13.4	⁵	44.5
Grants	0.4	27.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	27.5
Military ³	—	62.5	185.8	30.8	0.6	0.6	13.9	0.5	0.2	294.6
Credit Sales	—	43.8	170.7	30.0	—	—	13.2	—	—	257.7
Grants	—	18.4	14.8	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.7	0.5	0.2	36.3
SUDAN										
Economic ²	—	53.6	72.7	0.3	0.3	⁵	0.1	8.0	30.9	136.6
Loans	—	10.0	39.8	—	0.2	—	—	7.9	28.7	66.9
Grants	—	43.6	32.8	0.3	0.1	⁵	0.1	0.1	2.2	69.7
Military ³	—	⁵	2.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	2.2
Credit Sales	—	—	1.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	1.5
Grants	—	⁵	0.5	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.7
SYRIA										
Economic ²	0.4	44.9	43.1	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	61.1
Loans	—	23.6	29.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	24.0
Grants	0.4	21.3	13.7	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	37.0
Military ³	—	—	⁵	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1
Credit Sales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	—	⁵	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.1
TUNISIA										
Economic ²	0.2	242.6	282.3	54.2	46.7	45.7	54.4	48.8	16.1	768.9
Loans	—	50.7	163.6	36.1	20.2	27.2	32.1	36.0	8.5	365.4
Grants	0.2	192.0	118.8	18.1	26.4	18.6	22.3	12.8	7.6	403.4
Military ³	—	5.5	20.2	2.6	3.5	3.2	6.2	4.1	1.8	47.0
Credit Sales	—	2.8	0.2	—	—	—	—	2.2	—	5.2
Grants	—	2.7	18.6	2.4	3.3	2.9	5.3	1.8	1.8	38.8
TURKEY										
Economic ²	269.6	1,125.2	1,046.4	85.8	97.5	90.2	93.7	101.8	90.0	2,917.3
Loans	129.5	333.9	804.5	68.0	69.4	73.7	82.8	74.9	76.1	1,667.6
Grants	140.1	791.3	241.8	17.8	28.1	16.5	10.9	26.9	13.9	1,249.7
Military ³	311.8 ⁶	1,550.7 ⁶	1,049.7 ⁶	119.5 ⁶	125.2 ⁶	123.7 ⁶	142.6 ⁶	152.2 ⁶	150.3 ⁶	3,725.7
Credit Sales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15.0	20.0	35.0
Grants	146.1	1,519.5	982.3	93.1	98.5	89.7	99.4	60.7	58.5	3,147.9
YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC										
Economic ²	—	16.0	28.6	—	⁵	⁵	⁵	⁵	3.2	45.9
Loans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	16.0	28.6	—	⁵	⁵	⁵	⁵	3.2	45.9
Military ³	—	—	⁵	—	—	—	—	—	—	⁵
Credit Sales	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	⁵
Grants	—	—	⁵	—	—	—	—	—	—	⁵
YEMEN, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF										
Economic ²	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	2.4	0.1	0.1	2.8
Loans	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grants	—	—	—	—	—	0.3	2.4	0.1	0.1	2.8
Military ³	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

3 Military aid totals included the Foreign Assistance Act credit sales and grant programs given in the chart's military aid subcategories, as well as transfers from excess stocks, other grants and Export-Import Bank military loans.

4 Iran received a substantial amount of U.S. military aid through channels other than the regular Foreign Assistance Act credit sales and grant programs; aid included Export-Import Bank military loans of \$120-million in FY 1971; \$100-million in FY 1972; \$200-million (preliminary) in FY 1973.

5 Less than \$50,000.

6 Turkey received a substantial amount of U.S. military aid through channels other than the regular Foreign Assistance Act credit sales and grant programs; aid included \$158.6-million from the Greek-Turkish aid program, as well as \$7.1-million in excess stocks in FY 1946-52; excess stocks and grants of \$31.2-million in FY 1953-61 and \$67.4-million in FY 1962-67; excess stocks of \$26.4-million in FY 1968 and \$26.7-million in FY 1969; excess stocks and grants of \$24.0-million in FY 1970; \$43.2-million in FY 1971; \$76.5-million in FY 1972 and \$71.8-million (preliminary) in FY 1973.

SOURCE: Agency for International Development